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Introduction 
In recent psychiatric literature on schizophrenia the contribution of psycho-
analytic ideas tends to be discounted on the basis of two claims: the first is 
that psychoanalytic treatments of schizophrenia have been shown to be inef-
fective and the second repeats Karl Popper's original critique that psycho-
dynamic explanations are a priori unscientific because they are unfalsifiable 
(Bentall, 2006; McGorry, 2004). As Glen Gabbard notes, such statements 
follow the recent fashion in psychiatry which assumes that the success of the 
neurosciences renders psychodynamic contributions both redundant and 
outdated (Gabbard, 1994; Gabbard et aI., 2002). While it is disappointing to 
read statements which ignore important theoretical debates, such summary 
dismissal also indicates a missed opportunity to consider the experience of 
many therapists and patients who have found some benefit in a psycho-
analytic approach (Cullberg and Johannessen, 2004; Gottdiener and Haslam, 
2003). 
Psychoanalytic theory and practice is not an inert museum piece. At 
its best, psychoanalytic theory responds to developments in other sciences, 
changes in clinical presentations and the shifting social demands inherent in 
providing public mental health services. Psychoanalytic theories of affect and 
motivation, for example, are being integrated with developmental and social 
psychology, drawing on direct observation of young children and experi-
mental studies (Westen~ 1998). So too, some psychoanalytic theorists are 
proposing models of psychopathology which consider the roles of genetic 
factors in their interplay with developmental and psychosocial factors (Fon-
agy, 2001 b; Plomin and Rutter, 1998; Rutter, 2000, 2005). The broader impli-
cations of such findings are that mental health sciences in general have 
renounced the dream of achieving scientific purity by being based exclusively 
on genetics and the neurosciences and have begun to develop complex and 
multi-causal models which synthesize the biological and psychosocial causal 
factors of psychopathology. Such models therefore require the synthesis of 
research findings that investigate phenomena at different levels of analysis 
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and using divergent methods. A growing number of psychoanalytically ori-
ented researchers realize that these more integrated and sophisticated models 
offer opportunities for the confirmation, modification and falsification of 
psychodynamic propositions in a way that has not previously been possible 
(Emde and Fonagy, 1997; Fonagy, 2001b; Gabbard et aI., 2002). 
Nevertheless, discoveries in biological psychiatry are not easily translated 
into clinical applications - be they pharmacological or psychotherapeutic 
(Fenton, 2000). The clinical application of these findings requires a focus on 
the individual patient, the uniqueness of the therapeutic relationship and the 
level of psychological meaning which any illness state produces, whereas the 
epistemological framework of biological sciences seeks generalized aetio-
logical mechanism of psychopathology. Integration of these disciplines can 
begin only from an understanding that different epistemologies and thus 
methodologies apply to these different levels of analysis - biological, cognitive-
psychological and behavioural. A complete research programme for the men-
tal health sciences integrates these idiographic and nomothetic approaches. 
As Eric Kandel has noted, the traditional psychoanalytic methodology, 
based on the study of case histories, has exhausted its usefulness. In his view, 
psychoanalysis now needs to adopt a new intellectual framework integrating 
the latest findings in cognitive and neurosciences (Kandel, 1999). The future 
of the mental health sciences consists of developing the pharmacological and 
psychotherapeutic applications of gene, brain, cognitive, affective and social 
studies in their complementary role of treating· what we now know to be 
complex mental illnesses (Kandel, 1998). 
This is particularly true when considering how psychoanalysis might 
renew its understanding of schizophrenia while still retaining the key clinical 
insights it has accumulated. This chapter will" examine one aspect of the 
neuropsychology of schizophrenia, namely deficits in theory of mind. First, 
the work of Chris Frith is used to introduce the idea that aspects of schizo-
phrenia can be understood neuropsychologically as a deficit in theory of 
mind (Frith, 1992). This can be contrasted with the psychodynamic theories 
which are based on psychotic symptom formation resulting from specific 
defences against conflicting motivations. The chapter will put the argument 
that what psychodynamic theory typically describes as psychotic symptoms 
in schizophrenic patients, such as delusion and hallucination, may be a defen-
sive distortion in the cognitive productions which are attempts to explain 
or respond to deficits in theory of mind processing. While the neuro-
psychological deficit model is aimed at a level of analysis consistent with the 
neurosciences, the defence model is an abstraction of the ensuing cognitive 
and affective processes and lends itself more readily to psychotherapeutic 
application. Therefore, the integration of both deficit and defence models 
may provide a better basis upon which to conceptualize the psychotherapy 
of schizophrenia by delimiting specific therapeutic strategies for deficits 
and others for defences. The chapter will conclude by discussing what 
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aspects of the psychotherapy of schizophrenia might benefit from such a 
framework. 
Neuropsychological deficits of 'theory of mind' 
in schizophrenia 
Psychoanalysis, and indeed many of the current psychosocial interventions 
involved as a component of treatment for schizophrenia, would benefit from 
the integration of a theory of how neuropsychological deficits underpin 
the key features of psychotic symptoms. First, some definitional clarity is 
required with respect to the use of diagnostic terms. Psychoanalysts often 
loosely refer to psychosis and 'psychotics', and more specifically to psychotic 
defence mechanisms in cases that would not meet the criteria for a set of 
symptoms consistent with such a psychiatric diagnosis. In the present discus-
sion the term 'schizophrenia' will be used to refer to a specific clinical condi-
tion which is a subset of the psychotic disorders whereas the term 'psychosis' 
will be used to describe symptoms that consist of impairment in reality test-
ing. Psychotic symptoms form one characteristic of schizophrenia but are 
also associated with other disorders and can be artificially induced without 
implying the full syndrome of schizophrenia. Indeed, as a diagnostic entity, 
'schizophrenia' may lack construct validity. Both clinical and genetic investi-
gations suggest that the term may cover several different disorders with dif-
ferent aetiologies and mechanisms (Bentall et aI., 1988a, 1988b; Elkin, 2004). 
Nancy Andreasen analysed data from her own symptom scales which sug-
gested that the symptoms of schizophrenia tend to fall into three clusters: 
psychotic (delusion and hallucinations), negative (flattened affect, alogia, 
avolition, anhedonia) and disorganized (thought disorder, incongruent affect 
and bizarre behaviour) (Andreasen et aI., 1995a; Andreasen et aI., 1995b). 
Notwithstanding this important critique, this chapter will use the terms 
'schizophrenia' and 'psychotic symptom' according to the more or less 
traditional psychiatric definition. 
A growing body of research considers schizophrenia to be a disorder of 
social cognition - a term which can be defined as the capacity to mentally 
represent self and other as a guide to social interaction. Social cognition 
includes processes such as 'theory of mind' abilities, social perception, and 
attributional style. Impairment in social cognition may be an effect of infor-
mation overload during the acute phase of schizophrenia (Drury et aI., 1998) 
or may reflect a broader impairment in social functioning. Addington and 
colleagues found that deficits in social functioning are present throughout the 
course of schizophrenia and may persist despite antipsychotic treatment 
(Addington and Addington, 2000). Davidson and colleagues suggested that 
deficits in social functioning are present even before the onset of schizo-
phrenia (Davidson et aI., 1999). Some studies have suggested that this neuro-
cognitive deficit in social functioning has a genetic origin. For example, one 
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study found the same social deficits in children of a biological parent who 
has schizophrenia suggesting that social deficits may be related to what 
these researchers call a broader schizophrenic genotype (Hans et at, 2000). 
Although in some cases social functioning tends to remain stable in severity 
of impairment, or may even worsen in subsequent phases of the illness, there 
is considerable evidence that this is not necessarily the case and the social 
functioning of some patients does improve over time (Harding et at, 1987). 
Chris Frith (1992) proposed a more specific hypothesis that schizophrenia 
is essentially a dysfunction of meta-cognition or mentalization, that is, the 
ability to represent or think about one's own thoughts. Drawing on the ori-
ginal observations of Bleuler, Frith made a comparison of aspects of schizo-
phrenia such as social withdrawal and dysfunction to similar social deficits in 
autism - both can be conceptualized as deficits in the development of a 
theory of mind. The term 'theory of mind' (ToM) was originally used in the 
context of research on primate cognition and introduced by Premack and 
Woodruff (1978). It refers to what has turned out to be a uniquely human 
ability to understand human actions as based on the underlying mental states 
of their agent (Povinelli and Vonk, 2003). The definition of the term also 
includes the attribution of mental states, such as beliefs or desires, to explain 
one's own and other people's current, past and predicted behaviour. 
ToM provides a framework within which to understand how the self is 
linked to other mental representations. For example, Frith noted that normal 
cognitive functioning permits awareness of perCeptions (I know, 'it is rain-
ing') to be represented as beliefs attributed to others (John believes, 'it is 
raining') (Frith, 1994). Through the attribution of analogous mental states 
from the self to another, one might then infer the reason for certain behav-
iours (John is carrying an umbrella today because he believes it will rain). 
Beliefs about others' states of mind are formed in conjunction with a stable 
understanding of the self as having ownership of received perceptions, self-
generated cognitions, and affects. 
Impairment in ToM provides a useful theoretical model through which to 
understand the impairment of the ability to represent beliefs and intentions, 
particularly in the psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia. According to Frith 
(1992, 1994) anomalies can occur at three different levels of the perception of 
self and other. These consist of, first, disorders of willed action in which 
apathy or bizarre behaviours might result from the selfs inability to perceive 
its own intentions or will, second, disorders of self-monitoring whereby there 
is a reduced awareness that thoughts and actions are generated by the self, 
and third, deficits in other monitoring which impairs the capacity to read 
others' thoughts, intentions, desires and behaviours. Bentall applied the argu-
ment to hallucinations saying that the ability to perceive if an event is real or 
imagined relies upon interpreting and integrating a number of sources of 
information in their relation to the agent who receives and processes the 
perceptions, that is, the self. Therefore, hallucinations may well result from a 
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failure to locate the perceiver as the recipient of the perception, i.e., a failure 
in meta-cognitive ability to locate the self in the representations it receives 
and processes (Bentall et al., 1991). 
Such a theory can be applied more broadly to features of other common 
psychotic symptoms. The loss of the self as 'owner' of thoughts is apparent in 
thought insertion or thought broadcasting. The impaired capacity for the 
correct perception of another is apparent in delusions of alien control and 
persecution. So too delusions of persecution, jealousy or erotomania can be 
understood as a failure to monitor or accurately understand another's inten-
tion or desire towards the self. Melancholic delusion appears to imply a 
misattribution of the value of the self by the self. This very brief overview at 
least shows that psychotic symptoms can be understood as a deficit in the 
capacity to relate thoughts, actions, or perceptions to subjective intentions, 
particularly in terms of understanding the self as the agent of mental events. 
Of particular interest is research into the association of certain symptoms 
of schizophrenia with the ToM deficit. For example, Langdon and colleagues 
compared the pragmatic language skills and formal thought disorder of 
patients with schizophrenia to unaffected controls and found that poor appre-
ciation of irony and poor mind-reading were associated with high ratings of 
thought disorder (Langdon et a1., 2002). A further study found that people 
diagnosed with disorganized schizophrenia performed the most poorly on 
ToM tasks (Greig et aI., 2004). This study suggested that ToM performance 
was also correlated with higher levels of thought disorder, cognitive disorgan-
ization and verbal memory. ToM impairment has also been studied in the 
relatives of patients with schizophrenia by comparing performance on a trad-
itional false belief task and also a hinting task for a group of patients with 
schizophrenia, their first degree relatives and unaffected controls. Significant 
associations were found between schizophrenia risk, and failure on the hint-
ing task which was designed to test a subject's ability to infer a speaker's real 
intentions when 'dropping a hint' in indirect speech. In this study first degree 
relatives scored intermediate values between patients and controls in the hint-
ing task but the association between schizophrenia risk and failure on the 
false-belief tasks did not reach significance (Janssen et a1., 2003). 
Although, as previously discussed, this area of research was originally 
inspired by seeing a parallel between the social deficits in schizophrenia and 
those manifested in autism, two important distinctions have been noted 
which are likely to have important clinical implications. A study by Langdon 
et al. (2006) compared patients with schizophrenia to unaffected controls in 
their ability to discern the correct expression of affect corresponding to an 
emotionally laden cartoon strip. In addition to replicating findings suggesting 
impaired ToM abilities when measured by a subject's capacity to attribute 
false beliefs, they also found general difficulties in patients with schizophre-
nia attributing the correct emotions to the depicted social exchanges. They 
therefore proposed that schizophrenia is a generalized deficit in empathic 
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perspective taking which is responsible for the inability to understand not 
only others' beliefs and perceptions but also emotions. In contrast, autism is a 
more specific deficit in social understanding, particularly beliefs and inten-
tions, but the processing of the relation between simple events and basic 
emotions is not impaired (Langdon et ai., 2006). The other major difference 
between autism and schizophrenia is developmental. As Frith (1992) origin-
ally pointed out, deficits in ToM in schizophrenia consist of a breakdown in 
more or less intact ToM, whereas in autism ToM is assumed to be impaired 
from birth. Therefore, it would appear that an understanding of the devel-
opment of ToM is also relevant to understanding both its breakdown in 
schizophrenia and how one might integrate this developmental understand-
ing into a mode of psychotherapy in order to repair ToM impairments, which 
will be discussed in the final section of the chapter. 
There is already a substantial body of evidence to support the view that 
ToM is impaired in people with schizophrenia. The bulk of evidence is based 
on neuropsychological studies, but there have also been important neuroim-
aging studies. Frith and Frith (1999) have provided a discussion of the general 
neuroanatomy of ToM abilities. A subsequent neuroimaging study compared 
the performance of schizophrenic patients to controls when performing a 
socio-emotional task requiring metal state attribution and found lower activ-
ity in the left inferior frontal gyrus, a region of the brain believed to be 
involved in ToM function (Russell et aI., 2000). While deficits in ToM capaci-
ties are clearly associated with schizophrenia, it is only one of several deficits 
which contribute to the susceptability and course of schizophrenia. As sev-
eral recent reviews have emphasized, greater precision in understading the 
specific role of ToM deficits amoungst other deficits in social cogniton in 
schizophrenia awaits further research. In a review of some 30 studies on ToM 
in schizophrenia, for example, it was unclear how researchers ought to best 
measure ToM in schizophrenia and thus studies did not use standard meas-
ures (Harrington et aI., 2005). Before drawing conclusions regarding the 
implications of this research for clinical practice, more data is required regard-
ing the fluctuation of ToM over the course of schizophrenia, and how it 
affects patients' use of language, and social behaviour (Brune, 2005). 
Psychoanalytic theories of the defensive function 
of psychotic symptoms 
Although this research is still in its early stages, there is broad agreement that 
ToM deficits provide a useful conceptualization of an underlying social def-
icit in schizophrenia. While broadly speaking the research supports Frith's 
hypothesis, the theory does not provide a complete account for all aspects of 
psychotic symptom formation, most particularly delusional symptoms. Max 
Coltheart and Robyn Langdon extended the deficit theory and proposed that 
a single neurocognitive deficit is insufficient to explain the generation of some 
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psychotic symptoms such as multi-thematic delusional beliefs (Langdon and 
Coltheart, 2000). They argued that an additional deficit in the capacity to 
evaluate belief formation is also required, what psychoanalysts refer to as 
'reality testing'. Both deficits need to operate in tandem in order to generate 
more complex forms of delusional belief. The first factor accounts for the 
perceptual aberrations which generate the content of a delusion while the 
second factor accounts for why a delusion is first adopted and then main-
tained despite the lack of evidence to support it (McKay et aI., 2005). 
Capgras delusion offers a good test of the deficit theory. In this delusion a 
person forms the belief that their spouse or lover is an impostor who looks 
identical to the real partner. According to a deficit theory such as Langdon 
and Coltheart's model, such a delusion would result from a deficit in the 
capacity to link an affective response to facial recognition, i.e., the other 
person looks like my spouse but doesn't feel like him or her. In addition, 
those who adopt and maintain such a belieflack an ability to reject unsubstan-
tiated beliefs. However, McKay argued that Capgras delusion could also be 
understood as a belief formation that is influenced by an attempt to satisfy 
unacknowledged motivations (McKay et aI., 2005). In this case the motiv-
ation would be based on ambivalent feelings towards the partner. McKay's 
argument suggested that in addition to the neurocognitive deficits producing 
perceptual aberrations, defensive operations also distort information. Defen-
sive operations process information in an unconscious manner in order to 
satisfy conflicting motivations. Impaired reality testing, the second factor, 
would enable beliefs formed on the basis of such erroneous information 
and the distortion derived from defensive modification of unpalatable motives 
to go unchallenged. Therefore, at least in some cases, the first factor in a two-
factor model may be less the result of a neurocognitive deficit than a psycho-
logical defence. As McKay et al. (2005) noted, it may also be the case that the 
first factor arises out of a multitude of sources, both deficits and defences, 
because each interacts with the other. 
The argument hinges on building a coherent theory of how internal motiv-
ations contribute to mechanisms that distort information concerning one's 
self and one's place in the world. As McKay et al. (2005) noted, psycho-
analytic theories of motivation are only a subset of a broader set of theories 
of motivation. However, McKay does not elaborate more recent develop-
ments within psychoanalysis which recognize the theory of motivation as one 
of the key areas in need of theoretical renewal. Under the growing influence 
of attachment systems theory, many analysts have moved beyond Freud's 
articulation of drive theory and any requirement to posit underlying infantile, 
libidinal strivings in all human motivations. Motivation is not explicable 
by the pleasure inherent in the reduction of drive tensions but better attribut-
able to the need to maintain a sense of security and self-worth, the need 
to seek proximity to attachment figures and the need for adjustment to 
social and developmental demands (Bowlby, 1988; Fonagy, 200Ia). Therefore, 
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motivations can be seen in a relational context, as meeting social demands 
and satisfying current needs, while drawing on what Bowlby (1988) called 
internal working models of social interaction based on past experiences in 
close relationships. 
One of the hallmarks of psychoanalytic theory is its theory of defences 
which operate not only in psychopathology but are a component of everyday 
life. The notion of defence is integral to the psychoanalytic concept of the 
self. Very briefly, the self defends against incompatible ideas or affects in 
defence of its own integrity. This is threatened when certain ideas encroach 
which are incompatible or dangerous to a person's sense of himself or herself. 
Incompatible ideas may be motivated by desires which escape conscious 
awareness. While all defence involves a level of self-deception, not all defences 
require a distortion of reality. 
Supreme Court Judge Daniel Paul Schreber's autobiographical account of 
his multi-thematic, paranoid and hypochondriac delusions provides the locus 
classicus of psychoanalytic theories of psychosis (Freud, 1958 [1911]). His 
psychotic break occurred after he had the idea that it would be pleasurable to 
be a woman submitting to intercourse. One of the key points that Freud 
emphasized in his discussion of the Schreber case is that the manifestations 
of psychotic symptoms are attempts to restore a gap which had opened in the 
relation of the self to the world. This gap has opened because an incompat-
ible idea has been expelled in a radical form of defence. The precipitant to a 
psychotic break is therefore a vulnerability within the self which is later trig-
gered by certain social demands and this initiates the process of psychotic 
symptom formation. Freud recognized very early in his work that the defen-
sive operations which produce psychotic symptoms are of a quite different 
order of magnitude than those which repress i.deas internally (i.e., into the 
unconscious) and therefore produce psychoneurotic symptoms such as con-
version symptoms which have an unconscious meaning. Freud considered 
that psychotic defence was a radical form of defence based essentially on the 
mechanism of projection which attempts to modify the external world by 
projecting incompatible ideas into the external world, i.e., onto others. The 
defensive function of projection is to defend against self-generated ideas by 
denying that those ideas even belong to one's self. Projection therefore makes 
the world the bearer of all that is defended against, which may result in either 
withdrawal from a menacing world or greeting it with aggression. Therefore, 
implicit in Freud's account of psychotic symptom formation is a significant 
dysfunction and fragmentation of the self for the purpose of defence. 
Leaving aside the argument over the accuracy of such a view, there are 
several key points to retain from Freud's initial account of the process of 
psychotic symptom formation. The impairment in social functioning means 
that therapeutic relations with patients with psychotic symptoms are of a 
different order to other patients. The therapeutic relation preferred by Freud 
assumes a relatively normal capacity for social cognition and intact reality 
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testing whereas psychotic symptoms arise precisely in the context of an 
impairment in such cognitions. In short, we arrive at a reason why Freud 
considered that psychoanalysis has no clinical application when the patient 
does not manifest a transference neurosis. One can readily agree with those 
critics who suggest that Freud has little to directly offer for the psychological 
treatment of schizophrenia, indeed Freud says this himself. However, it is 
clear that the development of ideas of psychotic defence and symptom for-
mation can be used to create a substantially different theory and clinical 
technique to be applied to psychotic symptoms. This is a position that has 
permeated most schools of psychoanalysis for many decades and yet is 
never considered in negative appraisals of the outcomes of so-called 'psycho-
dynamic therapy'. The second point is that Freud's notion of defensive 
projection, like Frith's theory, considers the production of psychotic symp-
toms to result from a breakdown in the boundaries which contain thoughts, 
emotions and motivations as belonging to oneself. In this respect, although it 
may be stretching the point, one could also say that Freud's defence model is 
also based on a difficulty in mentalization. The difference is that in Freud's 
case impairment in mentalization is motivated and serves the function of 
defending the self while in Frith's model the problem is a neurocognitive 
abnormality not requiring explanation at a psychological level. Finally, it is 
apparent that Freud's view of defence implies that not only can defence 
motivate distorted perceptual information which may lead to psychotic 
symptoms such as delusion, but also psychotic defence impairs the capacity 
for reality testing which thereby maintains the delusional belief. These dif-
ferent theories of the relation of defence and deficit models of psychotic 
symptom formation are summarized in Table 4.1. 
Therapeutic implications of the integration of 
defence and deficit models 
To conclude, it is possible to briefly outline some of the therapeutic impli-
cations of the integration of deficit and defence models of schizophrenia 
Table 4.1 Defence and deficit theories of the formation of delusional symptoms 
Theory Domain 
First factor 
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proposed by McKay et al. (2005) using a psychodynamic framework. There 
are four broad principles which can be elaborated: 
1 The therapeutic relationship can be used as a means of understanding 
and processing mental states and thereby enhancing ToM capacities in a 
stable and secure setting. 
2 The reflection on developmental and life history in the therapy should 
be restricted to addressing the motivation factors underlying defensive 
functions only when clearly indicated. However, developmental and life 
histories cannot be used as a means of explaining neuropsychological 
deficits in ToM capacities. 
3 Practical social skills training can be focused on deficits in social-
cognition abilities and integrated with techniques to help the patient 
understand the meaning of their illness and its optimal management. 
4 Therapeutic intervention needs to actively address self-representations 
and the role of the self in meta-cognition in addition to reparative and 
palliative interventions following the acute phase of illness. This tech-
nique may also have a role in preventative interventions with populations 
at high risk of developing schizophrenia. 
Using the therapeutic relation in the treatment 
of schizophrenia 
Psychotherapeutic outcome research suggests that the therapeutic relation-
ship may be the major contributor to positive therapeutic outcomes. Although 
this is a matter of considerable debate within the outcome literature on psy-
chological treatments of schizophrenia, controHed trials have often struggled 
to show a significant effect of experimental therapies compared with sup-
portive therapy or effective standard case management (Jackson et aI., 2005; 
Turkington and McKenna, 2003). Although this is usually interpreted as a 
negative finding, it suggests that the role of social contact, the therapeutic 
relationship and forms of implicit social learning from professional contact 
may be the more active ingredients of therapy. Addington and Gleeson (2005) 
suggested that CBT, for example, ought to target directly the patient's social 
needs and that the therapy ought to emphasize the 'interpersonal context' 
and 'social consequences of relationships, including the therapeutic relation-
ship'. A mentalization approach provides a more explicit focus on these 
aspects as well as a theory of why they might contribute to therapeutic 
efficacy. 
Freud's often noted pessimism that psychoanalysis was an effective treat-
ment of 'cases of paranoid and dementia praecox' was in part derived from 
the inadequate regression-fixation model of developmental psychopathology 
which suggested that the most severe forms of mental illness where a result of 
the earliest oflibidinal fixations in development (Freud, 1958 [1911]). Freud's 
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model of analytic technique was based on the role of free association which 
aims to relax the function of reality testing in order to reduce the ego's 
censorship of unconscious thinking. The regressive consequences were 
quickly discovered and a therapeutic technique was developed which made use 
of the experiential impact of regression within the analytic setting. However, 
one aspect of technique in the therapy of psychosis emphasized by analysts 
as diverse in their theories as Donald Winnicott, Andre Green and Jacques 
Lacan is that free association is to be used only when there is sufficient 
stability of ego function to allow regression to be beneficial, i.e., within the 
treatment of neuroses only (Green, 1998; Lacan, 2006 [1959]; Winnicott, 
1975 [1954]). Since free association is designed to promote regression to earl-
ier developmental stages, it is not a technique to apply in cases of schizo-
phrenia (and so too the more severe personality disorders) where its use is 
more likely to result in what Balint (1992) termed malignant regression. 
Instead, in contemporary practice a conversational dialogue is encouraged 
with the therapist working actively to maintain mental closeness and prevent 
fragmentation, derailment and incoherence in speech. So too, in the treat-
ment of schizophrenia a high degree of modulation of affect is called for in 
order to make sessions a safe and productive experience. Psychotic content is 
never directly challenged or contradicted. Instead the therapist works with 
the patient to try to understand from where such thoughts or perceptions 
might arise. Therefore, the treatment is highly collaborative, aims at promot-
ing reflection on mental processes, and emphasizes the alliance between 
therapist and patient in seeking these common goals. Mentalization, that is 
the capacity to think about thinking, cannot be achieved in an adversarial 
atmosphere. 
Understanding developmental and family dynamics in 
the therapy of defences 
Psychoanalytic theory typically considers delusions to be productions which 
serve a restorative or adaptive function for the patient, even if they might 
contribute to what appears to be a social dysfunction. Therefore, the treat-
ment approaches tend to favour constructive elaboration and examination of 
these productions, rather than a crude attempt to eradicate such symptoms 
on the grounds of an appeal to their evident unreality (evident, that is, to the 
therapist). The specific content of such productions, and in particular delu-
sions and hallucinations, is considered to arise in the context of a patient's 
unique life history, a view which is not incompatible with the idea that the 
symptoms are formed because of underlying neurocognitive deficits in social 
cognition. 
A psychodynamic treatment of schizophrenia based on mentalizing prin-
ciples would include attempts to understand the content of psychotic symp-
toms within a framework of the patient's current social world, developmental 
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history and family dynamics. Links between the content of delusions and 
hallucinations and a patient's personal history and developmental context 
may provide a narrative framework but ought not to be conceptualized as the 
sale cause of psychotic symptoms. Following McKay's model, psychothera-
pies directed towards some delusional symptoms, for instance, are more likely 
to be effective if they target the underlying motivation for the aberrant belief 
formation, rather than attempting to convince a patient that their belief is a 
delusion through recourse to some objective refutation (McKay et aI., 2005). 
To some extent this would require the development of a formulation that 
entails aspects of developmental history and family dynamics which, follow-
ing the psychodynamic tradition, informs the therapist's interventions but 
would not be communicated directly to the patient. This might be done effect-
ively only on the basis of careful history taking, extended reflection of the 
patient's material and careful hypothesis testing within the context of a 
strong treatment alliance. 
However, a common error in the application of psychodynamic ideas to the 
treatment of schizophrenia is to assume that developmental aspects offer an 
explanatory framework that provides a causal explanation to the patient for 
the neuropsychological deficits from which they suffer. Evidence from ToM 
studies would suggest that this approach is misguided in many if not most 
cases. One can draw from this research a clear demarcation between the 
deficit and defence model that is valuable clinically. The operationalization of 
these concepts clinically draws on the distinctiQn between causes and mean-
ing, i.e., deficits in ToM in schizophrenia are likely to have a strong biological 
basis and can be described using a physical causal model, whereas defences 
produce effects of meaning; they are a lived experience of the self and its 
relations with others. The specific form of psychotic symptoms, the content 
of delusions and hallucinations, may well have links to a patient's life his-
tory, development and family dynamics. Working through these aspects of a 
patient's symptoms can have beneficial results because it provides a meaning-
ful framework and may be restorative of a personal narrative which includes, 
but is not overwhelmed by, the experience of psychotic symptoms. In this 
case, working through would consist of trying to help a patient gain some 
understanding of how their unique life events, family interactions, develop-
mental pathways and family or developmental life stage interacts and influ-
ences the onset, content or response to psychotic symptoms. As we shall 
discuss, personal meaning, a palatable explanatory framework for their men-
tal state experiences, and narrative continuity are critical to the patient's 
restoration of a functional sense of sel£ 
In essence, the demarcation between deficits and defences reduces the like-
lihood of damaging modes of practice that result from the failure of integra-
tion in the mental health sciences. First, the likelihood of the iatrogenic effect 
of destroying a patient's sense of agency by declaring they suffer from a 
mental disease state that has nothing to do with them. Second, the equally 
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damaging use of speculative and largely unfounded reconstructions of fail-
ures in early development or in the 'care-giving environment' which the 
therapist suggests to the patient are the cause of their schizophrenia. 
Skills training to address social cognition deficits 
Given the clear social deficiencies present in schizophrenia and the possibility 
that, at least in some cases there will be a progressive deterioration over 
the course of the illness, the direct targeting of ToM abilities would appear to 
be well within the domain of therapeutic treatments. It also follows that treat-
ments such as the psychodynamic approach, which emphasizes the thera-
peutic relationship, would predominately address the misinterpretations of 
self and other implied in psychotic symptom formation, within the therapeutic 
relationship. 
However, a more didactic and explicit focus on enhancing a patient's social 
cognition capacity needs to be considered. On the one hand, given the clear 
developmental and relational context in which ToM emerges, a discrete and 
simple ToM training model may be of little effect and even be somewhat 
alienating. Brune (2005) in his review of the ToM literature asserted that 
'future studies may also address whether patients could benefit from cognitive 
training in this domain' (Brune, 2005, p. 21). There is somehow an assump-
tion that ToM is acquired by some kind of social-learning process and 
therefore one could somehow 'train' it into patients when it is found to be 
defective. This is a problematic idea given that we know that ToM is not 
simply a cognitive skill and even less a learnt behaviour. Acquiring ToM is 
more likely to be achieved within the context of a specific social relation where 
aspects of the social interaction can be used for didactic purposes. On the 
other hand, it follows that if deficits in ToM have a neurocognitive basis, then 
therapies need to actively and explicitly address these deficits. This will 
involve a more directed and skill focused approach than is traditionally used 
in psychodynamic approaches. Whether such a training approach can be 
integrated with a psychodynamic or cognitive approach or would be better 
delivered as a separate adjunct therapy in selected cases can be determined 
only empirically. 
Self-representations in the therapy of schizophrenia 
Both cognitive and psychodynamic therapies for psychosis have specifically 
targeted the impact upon the self. For instance Jackson et al. (1996) used 
notions derived from constructivism which suggests that people construct 
their personal representation of the world, which creates representational 
models that serve as a framework for the attribution of meaning to personal 
events. Jackson et al.'s (1996) CBT model is focused on the protection of 
the self and the resumption of lifespan development following an initial 
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psychotic episode. The means by which the developmental process is inte-
grated into the therapy is limited in this cognitive-behavioural approach 
because the focus is more on the impact on the self of schizophrenia, rather 
than targeting a vulnerability in the self-schema. Indeed, researchers of differ-
ing orientations have considered the self to be a key target of therapeutic 
intervention (Frith, 2005; Morrison et aI., 2004). However, the deficit/defence 
model provides a more robust view of the role of the self in both the vulner-
ability to psychotic symptoms and the role of the self in the formation of 
these symptoms. 
For example, by way of comparison with autism, ToM research suggests 
that patients with schizophrenia suffer from an inability to understand them-
selves by accurately assimilating the perspective another has of them and this 
deficit crosses not only cognitive abilities but the processing of emotional 
states. One can infer that impairment in the critical feedback mechanism of 
self development would be an accumulating impoverishment in the represen-
tational schema of the self and other. Although clearly exacerbated by the 
onset and severity of psychotic symptomatology, some degree of ToM def-
icits typically predate onset as well as persisting beyond the resolution of a 
specific psychotic episode. This suggests that the psychotherapeutic targeting 
of ToM, broken down into self, other and self-other representations, could 
well be a key strategy in both preventative interventions for groups at high 
risk of their first episode of psychosis as well as having an important role in 
the prevention of relapse following initial psych.otic episodes. 
The use of a mentalizing framework aims to recreate within a therapeutic 
setting a situation where the boundaries of self can be recognized, intention-
ality of thought correctly attributed and the mental processes of others can 
be interpreted. This provides an experience of j:he patient's self as real via the 
therapist. Based on this theory, one can suppose that therapeutic gains are 
made at the point where this recognition can be clearly perceived by the 
patient. Unlike prior psychodynamic models, each of the goals which fol-
low from this theory can be defined and measured within a programme of 
research. One would predict that a patient's recovery from illness and decline 
in psychotic symptoms would improve alongside improved capacities for 
mentalization. 
Given the preliminary nature of research into ToM deficits in patients 
with schizophrenia, carefully targeted psychotherapeutic techniques must 
be framed in a tentative manner. The conceptual integration of deficit and 
defence models described in this chapter may well provide an enhanced 
framework within which to consider new therapeutic models and to recon-
figure psychodynamic therapies in a manner guided by this research. In the-
ory, it appears that orienting interventions around different strategies for 
addressing deficits in social cognition as distinct from defensive processes 
appears to be a reasonable approach. Many of the clinical applications 
discussed here can be integrated with the current variety of psychosocial 
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interventions used as interventions for schizophrenic patients since all need to 
be guided by a coherent theory of the therapeutic aspects of their interven-
tion. Furthermore, it is unlikely that any single psychological therapy will 
meet all of the needs of the diversity of patient suffering from schizophrenia. 
Whether enhanced efficacy for the psychosocial treatment of schizophrenia 
can be derived from the integration of deficit and defence models will need to 
await the further development, implementation and testing of such therapies 
in a clinical setting. 
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